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Abstract. This paper introduces the security and trust concepts in wireless sen-
sor networks and explains the difference between them, stating that even though 
both terms are used interchangeably when defining a secure system, they are 
not the same. The difference between reputation and trust is also explained, 
highlighting that reputation partially affects trust. The methodologies used to 
model trust and their references are presented. The factors affecting trust updat-
ing are summarised and some examples of the systems in which these factors 
have been implemented are given. The survey states that, even though research-
ers have started to explore the issue of trust in wireless sensor networks, they 
are still examining the trust associated with routing messages between nodes 
(binary events). However, wireless sensor networks are mainly deployed to 
monitor events and report data, both continuous and discrete. This leads to the 
development of new trust models addressing the continuous data issue and also 
to combine the data trust and the communication trust to infer the total trust. 
Keywords: Trust, model, wireless, sensor, networks, survey. 
1   Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in recent years, have shown an unprecedented 
ability to observe and manipulate the physical world, however, as with almost every 
technology, the benefits of WSNs are accompanied by a significant risk factors and 
potential for abuse. So, someone might ask, how can a user trust the information pro-
vided by the sensor network? 
Sensor nodes are small in size and able to sense events, process data, and commu-
nicate with each other to transfer information to the interested users. Typically, a 
sensor node consists of four sub-systems [1, 2]. 
 
• Computing sub-system (processor and memory): responsible for the control 
of the sensors and the execution of communication protocols. 
• Communication sub-system (transceiver): used to communicate with 
neighbouring nodes and the outside world. 
• Sensing sub-system (sensor): link the node to the outside world.  
• Power supply sub-system (battery): supplies power to the node. 
WSNs are a collection of self-organised sensor nodes that form a temporary network. 
Neither pre-defined network infrastructure nor centralised network administration 
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exists. Wireless nodes communicate with each other via radio links and since they 
have a limited transmission range, nodes wishing to communicate with other nodes 
employ a multi-hop strategy for communicating and each node simultaneously acts as 
a router and as a host. 
It should be noted that bandwidth available between communicating wireless nodes 
is restricted. This is because wireless networks have a significantly lower data trans-
mission capacity compared to fixed-line data networks. Furthermore, wireless nodes 
only have a limited power supply available, as power supplied by batteries is easily 
exhausted. Lastly, wireless nodes may join or leave a network at any given time and 
frequently change their location in a network; this results in a highly dynamic network 
topology.  
Due to impressive technological innovations in electronics and communications, 
small low-cost sensor nodes are available, which can collect and relay environmental 
data [3, 4]. These nodes have sensing, computing and short-range communication 
abilities and can be deployed in many environments. Such deployment can be in con-
trolled environments, such as sensing the atmosphere in buildings and factories, 
where the mobility of the nodes is of interest. Or they can be spread in hazardous and 
hostile environments and left unattended. Originally motivated by surveillance in 
battlefields for the military, interest in WSNs spread over a wide range of applica-
tions, from scientific exploration and monitoring, for example, the deployment of a 
WSN on an active volcano [5, 6], to monitoring the microclimate throughout the vol-
ume of redwood trees [7], to building and bridge monitoring [8, 9], to health-care 
monitoring [10] and a number of other applications presented in [2, 3, 11, 12]. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses security in WSNs 
and section 3 introduces the notion of trust. Trust and reputation models in WSNs are 
presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2   Security in WSNs 
In general, the key security goals of any network are to protect the network against all 
sorts of attacks, such as eavesdropping, fabrication, injection and modification of 
packets, impersonation; node capturing and many others, and to address other issues, 
like privacy, availability, accountability, data authentication, data integrity and data 
freshness. All these issues apply to traditional and wireless networks, but can have 
different consequences in WSNs, due to the open transmission medium, the resource 
constraints and the mass unattended deployment, especially in difficult and dangerous 
environments. 
Research continues to be conducted into the design and optimisation of WSNs, as 
the use of these networks is still in its infancy phase. The security issue has been 
raised by many researchers [13-23], and,  due to the deployment of WSN nodes in 
hazardous and/or hostile areas in large numbers, such deployment forces the nodes to 
be of low cost and therefore less reliable or more prone to overtaking by an adversary 
force. Some methods used, such as cryptographic authentication and other mecha-
nisms [24-31], do not entirely solve the problem. For example, adversarial nodes can 
have access to valid cryptographic keys to access other nodes in the network. The 
reliability issue is certainly not addressed when sensor nodes are subject to system 
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faults. These two sources of problems, system faults and erroneous data or bad  
routing by malicious nodes, can result in the total breakdown of a network and cryp-
tography by itself is insufficient to solve these problems. So new tools from different 
domains  social sciences, statistics, e-commerce and others  should be integrated 
with cryptography to completely solve the unique security attacks in WSNs, such as 
node capturing, Sybil attacks, denial of service attacks, etc.  
3   Notion of Trust 
Due to the nature of WSN deployment being prone to the surrounding environment 
and suffering from other types of attacks in addition to the attacks found in traditional 
networks, other security measurements different from the traditional approaches must 
be in place to improve the security of the network. The trust establishment between 
nodes is a must to evaluate the trustworthiness of other nodes, as the survival of a 
WSN is dependent upon the cooperative and trusting nature of its nodes.  
Security and trust are two tightly interdependent concepts and because of this in-
terdependence, these terms are used interchangeably when defining a secure system 
[32]. However, security is different from trust and the key difference is that, it is more 
complex and the overhead is high.  
Trust has been the focus of researchers for a long time [33], from the social sci-
ences, where trust between humans has been studied to the effects of trust in eco-
nomic transactions [34-36]. Although intuitively easy to comprehend, the notion of 
trust has not been formally defined. Unlike, for example, reliability, which was origi-
nally a measure of how long a machine can be trustworthy, and came to be rigorously 
defined as a probability, trust is yet to adopt a formal definition. 
Along with the notion of trust, comes that of reputation [37], which is occasionally 
treated by some authors as trust. Reputation is not to be confused with trust: the for-
mer only partially affects the latter. Reputation is the opinion of one person about the 
other, of one internet buyer about an internet seller, and by construct, of one sensor 
node about another. Trust is a derivation of the reputation of an entity. Based on the 
reputation, a level of trust is bestowed upon an entity. The reputation itself has been 
built over time based on that entity’s history of behaviour, and may be reflecting a 
positive or negative assessment. It is these quantities that researchers try to model and 
apply to security problems in WSNs.  
Among the motivating fields for the development of trust models is e-commerce, 
which necessitated the notion of judging how trusted an internet seller can be [37, 38]. 
This was the case for peer-to-peer networks and other internet forums where users 
deal with each other in a decentralised fashion [39-43]. Recently, attention has been 
given to the concept of trust to increase security and reliability in ad-hoc [32, 44-51] 
and sensor networks [52-54]. WSNs are open to unique problems, due to their de-
ployment and application nature. The low cost of the sensor nodes of a WSN prohibits 
sophisticated measures to ensure data authentication. Some methods used, such as 
cryptographic, authentication and other mechanisms [24-28, 30], do not entirely solve 
the problem. In the following section a brief survey, introducing only the methodol-
ogy used to formulate trust and how is it being updated, of existing research on trust 
in WSNs is presented in order to easily understand the concept of trust.  
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4   Trust in Sensor Networks 
Trust in WSN networks plays an important role in constructing the network and mak-
ing the addition and/or deletion of sensor nodes from a network, due to the growth of 
the network, or the replacement of failing and unreliable nodes very smooth and 
transparent. The creation, operation, management and survival of a WSN are depend-
ent upon the cooperative and trusting nature of its nodes, therefore the trust estab-
lishment between nodes is a must. However, using the traditional tools such as cryp-
tographic tools to generate trust evidence and establish trust and traditional protocols 
to exchange and distribute keys is not possible in a WSN, due to the resource limita-
tions of sensor nodes [44]. Therefore, new innovative methods to secure communica-
tion and distribution of trust values between nodes are needed. Trust in WSNs, has 
been studied lightly by current researchers and is still an open and challenging field. 
Reputation and trust systems in the context of sensor networks prior to this re-
search have received little attention from researchers, however, recently researchers 
have started to make efforts on the trust topic, as sensor networks are becoming more 
popular. Ganeriwal and Srivastava were the first to introduce a reputation model spe-
cific to sensor networks in [52]; the RFSN (Reputation-based Framework for High 
Integrity Sensor Networks) model uses the Beta distribution, as a mathematical tool to 
represent and continuously update trust and reputation. The model classifies the  
actions as cooperative and non-cooperative (binary) and uses direct and indirect (sec-
ond-hand) information to calculate the reputation. The second-hand information is 
weighted by giving more weight to the information coming from very reliable nodes. 
Trust is calculated as an expected value of the reputation and the behaviour of the 
node is decided upon a global threshold; if the trust value is below a threshold,  
the node is uncooperative, otherwise it is cooperative. The system propagates only the 
positive reputation information about other nodes [52], and by doing so, it eliminates 
the bad-mouthing attack, but at the same time it will affect the system’s efficiency, as 
nodes will not be able to exchange their bad experience with malicious nodes. The 
aging factor is also introduced to differently weight the old and new interactions; 
more weight is given to recent interactions.  
The DRBTS (Distributed Reputation-based Beacon Trust System) presented in 
[53] is an extension to the system introduced in [55], which presented a suite of tech-
niques that detect and revoke malicious beacon nodes that provide misleading loca-
tion information. It is a distributed security protocol designed to provide a method in 
which beacon nodes can monitor each other and provide information so that sensor 
nodes can choose to trust, using a voting approach. Every beacon node monitors its 
one hope neighbourhood for misbehaving beacon nodes and accordingly updates the 
reputation of the corresponding beacon node in the neighbour-reputation table. Bea-
con nodes use second-hand information for updating the reputation of their 
neighbours after the second-hand information passes a deviation test. A sensor node 
uses the neighbour-reputation table to determine whether or not to use a given bea-
con’s location information based on a simple majority voting scheme. The DRBTS 
models the network as an undirected graph, uses first-hand and second-hand informa-
tion to build trust. 
Garth et al., [56] proposed a distributed trust-based framework and a mechanism 
for the election of trustworthy cluster heads in a cluster-based WSN. The model uses 
direct and indirect information coming from trusted nodes. Trust is modelled using 
 Trust Models in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey 41 
 
the traditional weighting mechanism of the parameters: packet drop rate, data packets 
and control packets. Each node stores a trust table for all the surrounding nodes and 
these values are reported to the cluster head only and upon request. This approach is 
not based on second-hand information, so it reduces the effect of bad-mouthing. Hur 
et al., proposed a trust model in [57], to identify the trustworthiness of sensor nodes 
and to filter out (remove) the data received from malicious nodes. In their model, they 
assume that each sensor node has knowledge of its own location, time is synchronised 
and nodes are densely deployed. They computed trust in a traditional way, weighting 
the trust factors (depending on the application) and there is no update of trust. 
The proposed reputation-based trust model in WSNs by Chen et al., in [58], bor-
rows tools from probability, statistics and mathematical analysis. They argued that the 
positive and/or negative outcomes for a certain event are not enough to make a deci-
sion in a WSN. They built up a reputation space and trust space in WSNs, and defined 
a transformation from the reputation space to the trust space [58]. The same approach 
presented in RFSN [52] is followed; a watchdog mechanism to monitor the other 
nodes and to calculate the reputation and eventually to calculate trust, and Bayes’ 
theorem is used to describe the binary events, successful and unsuccessful transac-
tions, with the introduction of uncertainty. Initially, the trust between strangers is set 
to (0) and the uncertainty is set to (1). The model does not use second-hand informa-
tion, and how to refresh the reputation value is an issue. Xiao et al., in [59] developed 
a mechanism called SensorRank for rating sensors in terms of correlation by explor-
ing Markov Chains in the network. A network voting algorithm called TrustVoting 
was also proposed to determine faulty sensor readings. The TrustVoting algorithm 
consists of two phases: self diagnose (direct reading) and neighbour diagnose (indirect 
reading), and if the reading is faulty then the node will not participate in the voting.  
Crosby and Pissinou, in [60], proposed a secure cluster formation algorithm to fa-
cilitate the establishment of trusted clusters via pre-distributed keys and to  prevent 
the election of compromised or malicious nodes as cluster heads. They used Beta 
distribution to model trust, based on successful and unsuccessful interactions. The 
updating occurs through incorporating the successful/unsuccessful interactions at time 
t+1 with those of time t. Their trust framework is designed in the context of a cluster-
based network model with nodes that have unique local IDs. The authors of [61]  
proposed the TIBFIT  protocol to diagnose and mask arbitrary node failures in an 
event-driven wireless sensor network. The TIBFIT protocol is designed to determine 
whether an event has occurred or not through analysing the binary reports from the 
event neighbours. The protocol outperforms the standard voting scheme for event 
detection. 
A few other systems related to trust in WSNs, have been proposed in the literature 
such as [62-68], which use one or more of the techniques mentioned before to calcu-
late trust. The proposed model in [62] uses a single trust value for a whole group 
(cluster), assuming that sensor nodes mostly fulfil their responsibilities in a coopera-
tive manner rather than individually. In [63], the model is based on a distributed trust 
model to produce a trust relationship for sensor networks and uses the weighting ap-
proach to combine trust from different sources. In [64], a trust-based routing scheme 
is presented, which finds a forwarding path based on packet trust requirements, also 
using the weighting approach. In [65], a stochastic process formulation based on a 
number of assumptions is proposed to investigate the impact of liars on their peers’ 
reputation about a subject. In [66], the authors proposed a new fault-intrusion tolerant 
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routing mechanism called MVMP (multi-version multi-path) for WSNs to provide 
both fault tolerance and intrusion tolerance at the same time.  
The proposed model in [67] is an application-independent framework, built on the 
alert-based detection mechanisms provided by applications, to identify the malicious 
(compromised) nodes in WSNs. In [68], a parameterised and localised trust manage-
ment scheme for sensor networks security (PLUS) is presented, whereby each sensor 
node rates the trustworthiness of its interested neighbours, identifies the malicious 
nodes and shares the opinion locally. 
It is also worth mentioning that almost all the work undertaken on trust is based on 
successful and unsuccessful (binary) transactions between entities, that is, trust has 
been modelled in networks in general from a communication point of view, with no 
exception for WSNs, which is characterised by a unique feature: sensing events and 
reporting data. This unique characteristic is the basis of our research, which is focus-
ing on modelling and calculating trust between nodes in WSNs based on continuous 
data (sensed events) and will eventually introduce the communication as a second 
factor of trust. Accordingly, a trust classification for WSNs has been introduced in 
[69] and in [70, 71] a new framework to calculate trust in WSNs has been introduced, 
using the traditional weighting approach to combine direct and indirect trust. In [72], 
the sensed data was introduced as the decisive factor of trust, that is, trust in WSNs 
was modelled from the sensor reliability perspective. The RBATMWSN model intro-
duced in [73], represents a new trust model and a reputation system for WSNs, based 
on sensed continuous data. The trust model establishes the continuous version of the 
Beta reputation system applied to binary events and presents a new Gaussian Trust 
and Reputation System for Sensor Networks (GTRSSN), as introduced in [74], which 
introduces a theoretically sound Bayesian probabilistic approach for mixing second-
hand information from neighbouring nodes with directly observed information to 
calculate trust between nodes in WSNs, and finally a Bayesian fusion approach was 
introduced in [75], to combine continuous data trust based on sensed events and bi-
nary communication trust based on successful and unsuccessful transactions between 
nodes. 
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